Thinking inside the box: linking dynamic capabilities to theories of action by MacLean, Donald et al.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131224
 
 
Department of Business Administration 
 
 
 
 
UZH Business Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 310 
 
Thinking Inside the Box: Linking Dynamic Capabilities to 
Theories of Action 
 
Donald MacLean, Robert MacIntosh, David Seidl 
 
13 August 2012 
 
University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8053 Zurich, 
http://www.business.uzh.ch/forschung/wps.html 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131224
 
 
 
UZH Business Working Paper Series 
Contact Details 
 
 
 
Donald MacLean 
University of Glasgow 
Gilbert Scott Building 
GB-Glasgow G12 8SQ 
Email: Donald.MacLean@glasgow.ac.uk 
Telephone: 01413304649 
 
 
 
Robert MacIntosh 
University of Glasgow 
Gilbert Scott Building 
GB-Glasgow G12 8SQ 
Email: Robert.MacIntosh@glasgow.ac.uk 
Telephone: 01413304938 
 
 
 
David Seidl 
University of Zurich 
Universitätsstrasse 84 
CH-8006 Zurich 
Email: david.seidl@uzh.ch 
Telephone: +41 44 634 37 50 
 
3/25 
THINKING INSIDE THE BOX: LINKING DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
TO THEORIES OF ACTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
We argue that development of dynamic capabilities theory into a fully dynamic theory of 
strategy is inhibited by the operation of an incomplete set of perspectives on human action. 
Clarifying how human action is conceptualized, particularly as regards creativity and learning, 
might help strategy scholars to develop theory in ways that adequately address action at all 
levels of engagement in dynamic contexts, thereby turning existing contradictions into 
complementarities whilst accounting for issues of both content and process. By reorganizing 
existing literatures along action theoretic lines the paper reframes some of the difficulties in 
current theorizing, illustrates the value of this reframing by applying action theory to recent 
work on dynamic capabilities and proposes a rules-based framework as a potential 
integrating device for the field.  The paper closes by highlighting the need for interdisciplinary 
research in strategy.  
KEYWORDS 
Dynamic capabilities, action theory, creative action, learning, rules 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent “coming of age” paper on the Resource-Based Theory (RBT), Jay Barney and 
colleagues reflect on the evolution and possible future of the field after twenty years of 
sustained effort (Barney et al. 2011). They end the paper by concluding that scholars must 
help RBT “innovate or die” (Barney et al. 2011: 14) and they cite Foss (2011) to highlight the 
fact that theoretical development is limited by having “no unified model of people, but rather, 
different models ranging from the hyper-rational model of people offered by game theory to 
the stimulus-response puppets of some versions of behaviorism” (op. cit.: 10). RBT has made 
important progress in taking us inside the “black box” (Pavlou and el Sawy 2011) and 
renewed promise may lie in clarifying the role and nature of human action in organizational 
strategy processes.  
The concerns for RBT are salient across the rapidly growing literature on dynamic 
capabilities (DC), which spans theoretical works, (e.g., Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000; Helfat 2000; Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Teece 2007; Helfat et al. 2007), empirical 
research (e.g., Danneels 2010) as well as reviews and critiques (e.g., Makadok 2001; Winter 
2003; Zahra et al. 2006; Wang and Ahmed 2007; Ambosini and Bowman 2009; Easterby-
Smith et al. 2009; Barreto 2010; Di Stefano et al. 2010). Leading scholars have called for 
greater attention to be paid to the role of managers through a behavioral theory of the firm 
(Cyert and March 1963, Augier and Teece 2007) or through studies of “dynamic managerial 
capability” (Adner and Helfat 2003, Helfat et al. 2007, Martin 2011), namely “the capacity of 
managers to create, extend or modify the resource base of an organization” (Helfat et al. 2007: 
121) through management processes such as asset orchestration (Sirmon and Hitt 2009) that 
lead to evolutionary and technical fitness (Helfat et al. 2007). 
 DC scholars have done much to counter early critiques that the concept is “tautological” 
(Williamson 1999), internally inconsistent (Zahra et al. 2006) and thus empirically untestable 
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(Kratz and Zajac 2001).  Indeed, it is argued that although calls for further development 
persist DC is in its infancy relative to other fields (Helfat and Peteraf 2009). Responses have 
centered on behavioral theory, cognition, and the everyday activities of managers (Gavetti 
2005; Gavetti and Rivkin 2007; Oliver and Holzinger 2008; Oliver and Holzinger 2008; 
Regnér 2008; Augier and Teece 2009; Laamanen and Wallin 2009; Salvato 2009; Eisnhardt et 
al. 2010; Barney et al. 2011; Foss 2011) which fall broadly within the decision-making 
subfield of strategy process (March 1994). Whilst this is a vital area, we take the position that 
it is necessary but not sufficient in and of itself. A focus on decision-making does not 
adequately deal with the multifaceted nature of human action; indeed the former can be seen 
as an outcome of a rich set of interacting emotional, social, and historical embodied processes. 
We need to know more about the complex dynamic in which decisions are reached if we are 
to develop a theory of dynamic capabilities which resonates with the fullness of everyday 
management experience. In short, we need to conceptualize strategists as well as strategic 
decisions. 
Our use of theories of action falls within the scope of what Helfat and colleagues have termed 
Dynamic Managerial Capabilities (Adner and Helfat 2003; Helfat et al. 2007) and is distinct 
from, though complementary to ongoing work concerned with decision-making. We argue 
that to successfully account for the “how” of managerial action as opposed to the “what” of 
managerial decisions, DC scholars need to review the inadvertent tendency toward a 
theoretical fundamentalism which largely favors rationalism.   
By reorganizing existing literatures along the lines of different concepts of action and by 
introducing a novel theory of action, we aim to “work on the complementarities among the 
existing theoretical approaches to form a more integrated conceptualization of the firm,” 
recognizing that “novel theoretical lenses can potentially add significant value to the current 
state of the art” (Peteraf et al. 2008: 1111).  This requires the addition of a theoretical means 
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of accounting for the action of the embodied strategist – alongside accounts of disembodied 
strategic decisions and unified behavior of the firm. The central argument of this paper is thus 
that a fuller explanation of the strategist – i.e., those enacting dynamic managerial 
capabilities – requires the incorporation of a creative action lens alongside more traditional 
perspectives on human action. To make this argument we examine the axiomatic core of DC 
thinking as regards human action, and suggest a means of developing a view of DCs that 
integrates both decisions and action as key dimensions of content and process respectively. 
ACTION IN DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES  
The two most heavily cited DC papers offer a useful means of examining tensions in the 
literature (Di Stefano and Peteraf 2011).  In the words of Teece et al. (1997), dynamic 
capabilities are path-dependent combinations of processes, positions and paths through which 
firms engage in a Schumpeterian climate of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1943) under the 
stewardship of rational managers. Processes are “the way things are done in the firm, or what 
might be referred to as its routines or current patterns of learning” (Teece et al. 1997: 518). 
While they work with a view of managers as rational (op. cit.: 527, Table 1), the authors’ 
frustration about the limits of rationalism is also visible since they note that “an organization 
cannot improve what it cannot understand,” adding that “knowledge is highly tacit” (op cit: 
525 and “perhaps even more important than integration is learning”. Yet learning is 
acknowledged as an intrinsically social creative practice. Rather than seeing learning as the 
accumulation of experience, as it is typically framed in evolutionary economics (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982), we believe that there is a need to deepen our understanding of learning as an 
intentional, primary process rather than a social byproduct.  
The other heavily cited DC paper (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) details the finer-grained 
nature of DC and refutes criticisms of tautology and vagueness (Williamson 1999; Priem and 
Butler 2001a and 2001b). Eisenhardt and Martin also describe DC as comprising key 
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“processes that integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources” (2000: 1107), before 
homing in on routines as the basic component of DCs – “dynamic capabilities are thus 
organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations as 
markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die” (op. cit.: 1107). Again, there is an implicit 
view of firms and managers as rational, but this rationality is grounded in an evolutionary 
perspective of historically constrained emergence, combination and recombination. As they 
write, DCs are “complicated routines that emerge from path-dependent processes” (op. cit.: 
1114) and are often expressed as simple rules in high velocity markets in which market 
dynamism demands “the creation of new situation specific knowledge” (op. cit.: 1112). As in 
the earlier work of Teece et al., the mysteries of emergence in such specific situations are 
linked with learning processes the details of which are not elaborated. 
These two papers have helped advance RBT in general and DC in particular (see Barney et al. 
2011 and Barreto 2010 respectively for the latest comprehensive overviews), yet also 
highlight implicit assumptions which, we argue, are constraining development. Overall, it 
appears that DC theory is acknowledged as a powerful means of explaining the benefits 
accruing to firms, especially when firms are treated as a rational black box pursuing 
optimization. However, any move “inside” the box brings the realization that the operation of 
such capabilities rests on routines, rules, values, etc. These relate to the performance of a 
collective and emergent historically structured pattern in which rationality itself is located. 
Finally, and in tune with the familiar action-structure debate in social theory (Thietart and 
Forgues 1997; Baert 1998), the DC approach also leaves us wondering about the role of 
individual human action in the genesis, creation of, response to and maintenance of such 
structures. While the creativity of and the constraints on the individual strategist are 
acknowledged, they are barely explored. 
 
8/25 
The idea of dynamic managerial capability (Helfat et al. 2007) points to the central role of 
managers and strategic actors in creating and modifying resources, as they sense and seize 
opportunities in rapidly shifting environments. Ongoing work is developing our 
understanding of the role of individual discretion in managerial decisions (Finklestein and 
Peteraf 2007). Yet, a fuller understanding of the myriad of factors in decision-making requires 
a theory of human action geared towards explaining the dynamics of creative, situation-
specific learning processes both in and as social practice. As yet, there appears to be no 
agreed way of incorporating such detail into the theoretical apparatus (Tsoukas and Knudsen 
2003). What, for example, about everyday phenomena such as emotion, intuition and 
imagination; or politics, leadership and private agendas; or identity, the negotiation of 
meaning and chance? (Mitroff and Lyles 1984; Allison 1998) This lack of purchase on 
everyday reality perhaps explains the fairly weak pointers to “learning” and the ongoing calls 
for a microfoundation. It is clear that instead of focusing more closely on how to tackle this 
difficulty, the conceptual lens tends to zoom out and away from detail, presenting arguably 
vaguer, aggregative ideas such as innovation, change and learning (Teece 2007).  
RATIONAL AND NORMATIVE CONCEPTS OF ACTION IN STRATEGY  
We argue that there is an unacknowledged bias in the strategy literature with regard to human 
action and that DC thinking needs to reflect on its own foundations in rational and normative 
conceptions of human action.  Much of western scientific thought is founded on rational 
approaches, characterized by the explicit analysis of ends, means and conditions in pursuit of 
some optimum. Normative views of action are primarily concerned with the development and 
persistence of social, cultural and historical patterns in collectives and with members’ shared 
cognitive and social structures, values and norms (Joas 1996). Here we use “rational” as 
shorthand for what Weber termed “instrumentally rational” (zweckrational) i.e., based on 
calculation as opposed to “value rational” (wertrational), traditional (habitual) or affective 
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(emotional) forms of social action (Weber 1978). Hence the term “rational” here connotes 
formal economic rationality, where behavior is viewed as instrumental in the pursuit of utility 
(Hendry 2002) or, in the case of firms, profit maximization. In evidencing the influence of 
rational approaches we would cite a steady stream of relatively user-friendly, quasi-
economics frameworks produced by academics such as strategy-structure-performance 
(Chandler 1962; Rumelt 1984), structure-conduct-performance (Bain 1956), corporate and 
business environment (e.g., Andrews 1971; Porter 1980, 1985) through the resource base 
(Wernerfelt 1984; Rumelt 1984; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Barney 1991) and, of particular 
relevance to this paper, dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997; Helfat 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Martin 2000).  Normative conceptions of action are evident in concepts such as “dominant 
logics” (Bettis and Prahalad 1995), shared strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad 1989), 
paradigm (Johnson 1988) industry recipes (Spender 1989). They can even be discerned in 
RBT through acknowledgement of organisational repertoires of embedded competences 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Bogner et al. 1999) and routines (Nelson and Winter 1982; Miner 
1994).  
To some extent, rational and normative views are sides of the same Cartesian coin. In the 
former, action is intellectually driven; in the latter, intellect expresses the deep values and 
norms underpinning actions which are socially structured. One foregrounds premeditated 
mechanical action; the other focuses on persistence and patterning in social form. Neither 
explains the inherent dynamics of spontaneous creativity in which bodily action and 
intellectual activity are dialogically intertwined. Joas claims that the relative neglect of 
creativity in the social sciences limits our ability to deal with the challenges of contemporary 
society (1996). In turn, we argue that the axiomatic core of strategy is struggling to keep up 
with broader changes in society. 
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In relation to DCs, we now perceive a new problem – or perhaps an old problem in a new 
light: the DC literature appears to straddle the two main conceptions of human action by 
conceiving the firm as a rational actor while using the normative routines and rules as the way 
in which DCs are expressed. If accepted, this introduces theorizing difficulties that are not 
explicitly acknowledged (Tsoukas and Knudsen 2003). DCs offer a theory of change as a 
rational problem-response or normative triggered-outcome, both of which are devoid of 
detailed explanations of the action through which change actually occurs. This theoretical 
hollowing out offers a major opportunity if a novel lens (Peteraf et al. 2008) primarily 
concerned with explanations of enacted creativity can be incorporated into DC research. Any 
new lens would complement existing views of control, problem-solving and sustainability and 
might provide a robust DC micro-foundation which clearly accounts for management action.  
CREATIVE ACTION  
In acknowledging the messiness and complexity of strategic behavior, a growing body of 
work highlights the importance of context in influencing strategy. Here strategic behavior is 
inextricably bound up in context with emphasis given to chance, ignorance, private agendas, 
and, most importantly, individual personalities. This acknowledgment of the non-corporate, 
private, emotional, intuitive individual, and indeed the recognition of the organization as a 
melting pot of numerous personal biographies and power relations (Allison 1998), is at odds 
with both the rationalist conception of the monolithic decision-maker and the normative view 
of a triggered herd reaction.  
Despite a high degree of diversity both in the theoretical terms used and the timing of their 
appearance in the literature, researchers in this group are united by their openly critical stance 
toward (a) traditional Cartesian rationalism in which the sequencing of thinking and action 
divides content and process and (b) normative views that persistence rather than change is the 
fundamental feature of social patterns (Joas 1996). Moreover, the main concern is with the 
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outcomes of context-specific, quasi-political practices and processes in organizations 
(Pettigrew 1973, Allison 1998) which tend to cast strategic behavior as– at least partly– an 
emergent  phenomenon (Mintzberg 1978).  
Work in this vein, attempting to explore strategy and organizational change, includes the 
emergent fields of chaos theory (Thietart and Forgues 1997), complexity theory (MacIntosh 
and MacLean 1999), theory of distributed knowledge (Tsoukas 1996), structuration theory 
(Whittington 1992) and certain forms of institutional theory (Mayer and Whittington 1999), 
amongst others.  The common thread is a focus on strategic behavior as an emergent outcome 
amongst co-evolving and interacting players. The concern with micro-phenomena, 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1984) and context as “situatedness” is variously expressed as a 
degree of sympathy with “the practice turn” in social theory (Whittington 2006), a focus on 
knowledge (Spender and Grant 1996), knowing, action and learning in communities of 
practice (Wenger 1998) or in ideas such as strategy as practice (Johnson et al. 2007). 
Both prominent social theorists (e.g. Joas 1996) and leading scholars of organization theory 
(e.g., Tsoukas and Knudsen 2003) have argued for a new theory of human action in which 
creativity is regarded as the primary facet of human action. Joas in particular sharply criticises 
rationally and normatively oriented concepts of action, and offers a theory of creative action 
based on a combination of insights from the traditions of American Pragmatism and German 
philosophical anthropology. In so doing, he questions the validity of approaches which 
assume a teleological view of intentionality, instrumental control of the body and autonomy 
of the individual.  
Joas espouses a view in which intention is seen as a continually emerging facet of an ongoing 
dialogue between means, ends and context.  Further, the body is seen a the source of personal 
expression, though not necessarily an instrument of the intellect, and identity is viewed as an 
evolving process occurring in social interactions:  
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“only by introducing a concept of action which consistently takes account of this creative 
dimension can the other [i.e. rational and normative] models of action be assigned their 
proper logical place. As a consequence, only in such a manner can the wealth of concepts 
involved in the concept of action, such as intention, norm, identity, role, definition of the 
situation, institution, routine etc. be defined consistently and in a manner which does justice 
to what they are meant to express”   (p5) 
Perhaps the contrast between rational and normative views, on the one hand, and the creative 
view of action, on the other hand, is most expediently exemplified by referring to a familiar 
analogical situation such as team sports, where the creative urges of individuals are expressed 
as emergent outcomes which unfold as the game progresses. Dialogue between the means, 
end and situation reflects the continual co-evolution of aspirations, moves and tactics as the 
game ebbs and flows. No individual enters the match with a script or a set of triggered 
responses, though elements of both (in the form of plans, tried and tested formations, 
rehearsed set-piece routines, etc.) may come into play at appropriate moments. Indeed 
structures, routines and plans are central to a team’s ability to improvise. What moves from 
potential to actual, from abstract to concrete is influenced by the embodied capabilities and 
urges of those who are playing the game. Skilful players move from one mutually created 
situation to the next; intention emerges in the moment – varying from winning the match, 
scoring a goal, stopping an opponent, seeking support, etc. Pain and injury matter. Health, 
mood, physicality and disposition count. Good players are not necessarily instrumentalizing 
their bodies as plans are executed. Sometimes the body takes over and the mind is witness to 
unpremeditated expression. More commonly, what is expressed and what intended are 
inextricably bound up in a way that defies traditional sequences of thought and action. 
Critically, interaction is central, since some relationships are productive and some are not.  
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Everything that happens, happens through processes of inter-relating as players and teams 
experiment, learn, win, lose and build identities together. 
Overall, this view of creative action departs from the fundamentally Cartesian orientation of 
its rational and normative counterparts in that the sequential separation of experience into 
thinking components and acting components doesn’t hold. We should also note that the three 
themes are mutually constitutive of each other, i.e., intention emerges through the physical 
body in social interaction, social interaction is influenced by embodied processes and 
intention, and biography develops along with emergent intention through social interaction.  
CREATIVE ACTION AS A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING DYNAMIC 
MANAGERIAL CAPABILITIES 
We have reviewed three perspectives which attempt to explain action, and our view is that 
such explanations are always partial.  Indeed our understanding is made deeper and richer by 
holding and working with the different explanations and insights presented by these 
perspectives. Hence, our contribution is to show how viewing DCs in terms of creative action 
may deepen our understanding of what is acknowledged as an important topic (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2009) by focusing attention on issues which are neglected by existing perspectives.  
Table 1 illustrates that it is possible to identify three different theories of action used – 
explicitly or implicitly – in theorizing about DCs.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
If this mapping suggests a gap in our theorizing, what would a creative action perspective on 
DCs add to our understanding?  To answer this question we return to the two seminal papers 
discussed earlier – Teece et al. (1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). In Teece et al., the 
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firm as a set of DCs is cast as a rational, problem-solving actor seeking to maximize 
competitive advantage, implying that this is a systematic, quasi-scientific process in which 
ends, means and conditions are matched.  This also conforms to Barreto’s (2010) definition of 
DC. However, since DCs in turn comprise routines and rules, the emphasis switches from 
optimization and problem-solving to sustainability and co-ordination. This appears consistent 
with the development of the theories put forward both by Teece and his colleagues and by 
Eisenhardt and Martin. However, we suggest that the differences between these two 
authorteams are symptomatic of a (implicit) movement across levels of analysis and theories 
of action. Contrary to the view of Teece and his colleagues, Eisenhardt and Martin conclude 
that competitive advantage is neither  optimized nor sustainable through the operation of DC, 
but that inclusion in an industry group is sustained by common routines. It almost slips past 
unnoticed that Eisenhardt and Martin have shifted their focus to issues of membership in a 
social structure and are therefore placing greater emphasis on normative theories. Teece and 
his colleagues, on the other hand, emphasize the link between dynamic capability and 
superior performance, explicitly stating that the dominant orientation of the firm is rational. 
Although each paper is consistent in its position, the two positions operate at different levels 
of analysis: the firm, on one hand, and, straddling this, the routine-strategic group on the other. 
Critically, neither deals in detail with the finer-grained processes or micro-foundations.  We 
argue that this is because the concepts of action which they employ are geared towards other 
concerns.  
Table 1 shows that a creative action lens focuses explicitly on the blind spots of rational and 
normative views, e.g, individual and group acts of spontaneous creativity and social learning 
in processes of human interaction. Creative action is much better equipped to explain the 
emergence of novelty through relational processes in which identity is constructed as highly 
contextual, emergent and embodied.  Action is first and foremost embedded in everyday 
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situations populated by individual human actors doing strategy (and other things) together. 
Bringing the strategist back into view would help furnish a fuller explanation of the operation 
of DCs.  In practical terms we would need to add considerably more detail on (1) the 
biographies, aspirations, expressions and more private thoughts of the key actors in any 
situation, (2) the dynamics of their interactions and how such interactions related to processes 
of identity and meaning in the situation, and (3) how both (1) and (2) are influenced by and 
influence evolving processes of intention and action.  
Consequently, to build a creative action perspective in DC research more work is needed in 
these three dimensions.  Interestingly, one might regard this as traditionally more the domain 
of strategy process than content, but in fact these issues straddle both. We conclude by 
outlining a research agenda that deepens our understanding of these three areas and makes 
some observations about the implications for both method and the persistently problematic 
distinction between content and process. 
A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR DYNAMIC MANAGERIAL CAPABILITIES AS 
STRATEGIC ACTION 
To enrich our conceptualization of human action in DCs, we propose work in the following 
areas.  
Rationality, Intention and Emergence 
It is important to note that we are not saying that people, groups and firms are irrational, but 
simply that our conception of rationality and its treatment at different levels of analysis has to 
be more sophisticated. While it may be entirely appropriate, – at one level– to treat the firm as 
a unified rational actor seeking to solve problems, we would also argue that at the level of 
routines action is more concerned with the preservation of structures, social belonging and the 
cultural persistence of a collective or group.  Moving one level down, whilst individual 
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strategists may well be acting in accordance with clearly held intentions and goals, creative 
action would view these as being in continual evolution in what is largely a political dynamic. 
At the level of individual actors, interest would shift towards the quasi-improvised sense-and-
respond movements through which emergent intentions, enacted practices and outcomes co-
evolve in order to achieve a workable marriage of selected individual, group and firm level 
aspirations and capabilities in any given situation. 
Firms, routines, strategists and embodied expression 
To a great extent, the evolution of intention described above is influenced not only by the 
specifics of any given situation, but also by the “baggage” of those involved. The acting 
human body is a subject of growing interest in organization theory but, at best, takes on 
various shadow-like appearances  (Hassard et. al, 2000), primarily as an entity which is 
instrumentally manipulated in the service of the intellect. The body in all its fullness – as the 
location of experience and creative expression, the site of sensitivity, emotion, intuition, 
health, biography and aesthetic awareness– remains as marginalized as the biographies of the 
unique individual to which it relates (Beech and Johnson 2005).  Allison argues forcefully 
that  
“players are also people. Men’s metabolisms differ. The core of the bureaucratic politics mix 
is personality. How each man manages to stand the heat in his kitchen, each player’s basic 
operating style, and the complementarity or contradiction among personalities and styles in 
the inner circles are irreducible pieces of the policy blend. Moreover, each person comes to  
his position with baggage in tow, including sensitivities to certain issues, commitment to 
various programs, and personal standing and debts with groups in society” (Allison, 
1998 :199) 
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We therefore suggest that DC research needs to delve deeper into the influence of leadership, 
experience, relationships, personality, management styles, moods, intuition, poetics and 
inspiration. Detailed data on the behavior of the strategist(s) may of course be refined by 
selection structures and processes such as rules, routines, power structures and firm-level 
priorities, but as the creative substrate of variety-production, greater consideration of the 
embodied human personality is vital to our understanding of how DCs originate, operate and 
evolve.  
Strategy as problem-solving, sustainability, meaning and identity formation  
Our earlier analysis of two prominent DC papers established that existing DC research 
focuses on the optimization of firm-level competitive advantage and the sustained industry 
position. Whilst these are clearly key dimensions of strategy, we would argue that we need to 
deepen our understanding of the relationship between the ways in which strategies work for 
firms and what this means for the strategists who enact them. Research needs to strengthen 
our purchase on how the inter-subjective and functional dimensions of strategy are related, i.e., 
the question “How does strategy work?” needs to be better linked to “What does strategy 
mean?” for those involved. Creative action points to identity formation as fundamental to 
strategy as a social process. This has already been noted by some strategy scholars (Peteraf et 
al. 2008; Beech and Johnson 2005). Understanding the relationship between how strategy 
becomes effective, what “effectiveness” means to those involved and, critically, how 
involvement in (or exclusion from) the dialogic relation between the two may help cast new 
light on familiar issues of “implementation failure” (Pettigrew 1992). 
Implications for research designs and method 
Finally, it is worth noting that an enhanced set of lenses with which to view strategic action, 
in turn requires a broadening or rebalancing of the methodological repertoire.  A move from 
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the firm as black box to individual action implies granularity and subjectivity, which we 
suggest will necessitate the inclusion of phenomenological forms of research.  Moving inside 
the box to research DCs from a creative action perspective is also likely to mean a more 
inductive form of theory building. One would therefore expect to see greater use of (and 
openness to) mixed methodologies and, in particular, an increasing role played by 
ethnographic studies, single or multiple case-studies, engaged “mode-2” (MacLean et al 2002) 
style projects and the like. In short, we need to get closer to the action. 
Level of analysis Firm Routine Strategist 
Key Model of action Rational 
 
Normative Creative 
Exemplar paper Teece et al. (1997) Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) 
 
Key concerns Optimality 
Problem-solving 
Sustainability Creativity 
Focal Units Corporation Organization Situation 
Key process Control 
 
Co-ordination Negotiation 
Process style Scientific-logical 
 
Cultural-cohesive Political- interactive 
Strategic behavior Choice – 
decision-making 
 
Output 
performance 
Outcome 
patterns 
Key concepts Ends, means and Norms, rules, routines, Interaction, emergence, 
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conditions 
 
structures power 
Key influences Economics, natural 
sciences 
Anthropology, cognitive 
psychology 
 
Politics, sociology, social 
psychology 
Impact on DC literature Firm as a rational actor 
seeking to maximize 
competitive advantage; 
strategy as a cohesive 
logical framework and 
systematic mechanical 
process; DCs as 
cognitively driven: 
sense, seize, reconfigure 
Routines as the basis of 
dynamic capabilities; 
strategic behavior as 
repeated patterning of 
resources and activities 
geared towards 
sustainability 
Strategists as creative, 
politically oriented actors 
enmeshed in dynamic co-
evolving networks of 
learning, identity formation 
and meaning-making through 
situated acts of accepted 
practice and improvisation 
Table 1: Concepts of action in the strategy literature 
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